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NOTES
DAMAGES FOR THE INFRINGEMENT OF A PATENT.
Just when damages or profits will be granted in a bill
against the infringer of a patent is an interesting question.
Before the Act of Congress of I87O the infringer was re-
garded as a trustee and recovery was allowed the plaintiff of
all profits the defendant had made. The Act provided that
the plaintiff be given "in addition to profits, to be accounted
for by defendant, damages which the complainant has sus-
tained thereby." To procure this relief in equity some equit-
able grounds must exist. An action for damages or profits
alone must be pursued at law. A bill for a mere naked ac-
count of profits will be dismissed.'
'Root v. Lake Shore R. R., 105 U. S. I89.
(103)
Relief in the form of damages and profits will be given even
"though the patent has expired if the application for an injunc-
tion has been made a sufficient time before, so that in the
ordinary course of proceedings a final decree would issue
before the expiration of the patent.2 The expiration of the
-patent therefore will not per se oust equity jurisdiction3
In the recent case of Draper v. American Loom Company,
I6I Fed. 728, though the bill was filed three months before the
expiration of the patent, an injunction was refused and dam-
ages were awarded, to be secured by a bond filed by the defend-
ant. The defendant in this case was a manufacturer who used
a small shuttle of a loom, patented by the complainant, on looms
in his factory. The reason given by the Court for refusing
an injunction is, that to stop the defendant's looms for the
remaining time during which the patent was to run, would
result in damages to him incommensurate with the loss suffered
by the plaintiff if the use were not enjoined. A case in which
a preliminary injunction was refused on the same ratio deciden-
tis, was invoked to substantiate this position. Westinghouse v.
Burton Co., 77 Fed. 301. . In an earlier case in apparent con-
flict, the Court said that the fact that a patent will expire in
a short time is a reason a fortiori for granting relief inas-
much as the owner has only a short period remaining in which
to enjoy the exclusive benefits and privileges of his invention.4
Much emphasis was also placed in this case upon the fact that
the defendant knowingly invested his money in an infringing
business.
There is a difference in facts between the case just mentioned
and Draper v. American Loom Co., 161 Fed. 728. In the
former the defendant was violating the patented article in its
entirety, while in the latter, Draper v. American Loom Com-
pany, only a small portion of a patent was being infringed.
A further difference exists. In the former case the defendant
was using the invention, a telegraph instrument, in the only
manner in which it could be utilized by the complainant com-
pany for profit; in the latter case the complainant was a manu-
facturer, the defendant a user of a portion of the complain-
ant's invention. This distinction is brought out by Curtis, J.,
in Forbush v. Bradford, 21 Monthly L. J. 471, in the following
language: "The complainants are makers of looms but do not
'Clark v. Wooster, i1g U. S. 322.
* Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wilson Sewing Machine Co., 38 Fed. 586.
'American Bill Co. v. Western Telegraph Co., s8 Fed. 409.
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use them. So that this particular mode of infringement by the
use of the thing patented though it is a violation of the ex-
clusive right claimed by the complainant does not deprive them
of a monopoly which they desire to retain in their own hands."
The law seems to be that, where both are manufacturers, an
injunction will be decreed even after the expiration of a
patent to prevent the sale of articles manufactured surrepti-
tiously during its continuance.5 Certainly, then it would appear
that an injunction should issue in such cases prior to the ex-
piration of the patent.
The law in regard to when damages and profits will be
awarded appears to be as follows: (I) An injunction will issue
giving the right to an account of profits and damages suffered in
addition by the plaintiff, unless (2) in the discretion of the
Court the injury upon the business of the infringer would
be entirely out of proportion to the plaintiff's damages, in
which case profits alone will be allowed; (3) if the patent ex-
pires before an injunction has been issued relief will be given
in profits and if the facts justify it damages as well.6 Thus in
the latter two sets of facts the effect of the inhibition against
an account for profits alone in equity is avoided, by including
in the same bill a prayer for an injunction which will be
refused, and the other relief of profits or damages granted.
THE EFFECT OF A CONDITION IN A BILL OR NOTE UPON ITS
NEGOTIABILITY.
The case of Rieci: v. Daigle (Supreme Court of North Da-
kota, June I9 th, i9O8, 117 N. W. 346), holds that a promis-
sory note that contains the following stipulation, "This note
subject to the conditions of hotel purchase contract of even
date herewith," is non-negotiable, and hence an endorser
thereof takes the same subject to all the legal defenses or set-
offs existing in favor of the maker of such note at the time
the action thereon is brought.
While the case accords with a long line of decisions on this
point, it suggests the question as to what references or col-
lateral agreements can be set forth in a note without destroy-
ing its negotiability, and further, the second question as to
'Crossley v. Derby Gas Light Co., 4 L. J. C1h. 25.
'Beedle v. Beinnett, 122 U. S. 71.
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whether you can go beyond the face of the note to determine
whether the reference or collateral agreement makes the note a
conditional one.
Under the commercial law a statement of the consideration
for the undertaking may be stated on the face of the note, pro-
vided no condition is created in the promise or order. For ex-
ample, "Pay A or order $i,ooo one month from date, for
stock," has been held negotiable.' Likewise the Negotiable In-
strument Act (Sect. 3, Sub Sec. 2) is declaratory of the com-
mercial law, that "an unqualified order or promise to pay is un-
conditional though coupled with a statement of the transac-
tion which gives rise to the instrument." Rogers v. Smith, 47
N. Y. 324; Donaldson v. Grant, 15 Utah, 231.
As pointed out by Professor Ames in his criticism of the
Act (Brannen on Negotiable Instrument Law, p. 44), it is
not clear just what these words mean or how much latitude they
allow for references to be made on the face of a note to a
collateral agreement. The American cases are in quite ac-
cord with Reich v. Daigle (above) that a provision in a note
"subject to contract of even date" or "as per contract" makes
such note non-negotiable.
2
None of the cases however treat the question as to just
when a reference to or statement of the transaction which
gives rise to the instrument ceases to be a mere ref-
erence and becomes a condition or contingency. Will the
maker of a note that contains the reference that it is given
"for a horse" be allowed to plead that the reference was made
so as to provide for the contingency of a possible death of the
horse before delivery or that the horse was dead at the time
the note was given and thus prove a failure of consideration?
That is, a statement of the transaction which gave rise to the
instrument may be a mere reference or it may express a con-
dition as between the maker and the payee of the note. Like-
wise a statement "as per contract of even date" might be only
a reference to the transaction or it might refer to a contract
which makes the payment of the note conditional as between
the maker and the payee.
This brings forth the second question, as to whether you can
'Coffman v. Campbell, 87 Ill. 98; Griffin v. Weatherby, L P- 3, Q. B.
753.
*Cushing v. Fields, 7o Me. So; Parker v. Am. Ench. Bank, 27 S. U.
ioTz; Hickman v. Rayl, 55 Ind. 55'; Post v. Kingina Hemlock A. Co.,
171 Pa. 65; Reed v. Cossett, 153 Pa. St. 156, contra; Jury v. Baker,
E B. & . x56.
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go beyond the face of the note in determining whether or not
the reference or collateral agreement makes the note condi-
tional and, therefore non-negotiable. The whole basis of the
commercial law answers the question in the negative, for the
negotiability of a bill or note cannot be made to depend upon
the fulfillment of a condition. It must be a bill or note when
executed.8 This is clearly the law in cases where the condition
is expressed on the face of the note. The doubt exists in those
cases where it is uncertain whether the reference or statements
on the face of the note do or do not express a condition. In
the case of Jury v. Baker (above) Lord Campbell, C. J., held,
that in an action on a promise to pay, where there was cer-
tainty as to the payor, payee, and amount and date, that the
words "as per memorandum of agreement" did not of them-
selves make the promise conditional, but it was incumbent on
the defendant in his plea to prove that such was their effect.
See Jarvis v. Wilkins, 7 Mes. and W. 410. If this case be
followed the maker of any note upon which there is a re-
ference, which of itself expresses no condition, may in an ac-
tion against him by an innocent endorsee set up the equities of
the collateral agreement refered to or those arising from the
transaction stated.
THE EFFECT OF CONSENT AS NEGATIVING CRIME.
The very interesting question of how far the consent of the
person against whom an otherwise criminal act has been done
prevents that act from being a crime is suggested in the recent
case of State v. Young, 96 Pac. Rep. IO67. One statute in the
jurisdiction makes adultery a felony and another justifies a
killing done in preventing a felony directed against the homicide
or his wife. A suspecting that B contemplated adultery with
his wife, slew B, the wife not being present. The defense was
that the statute justified the killing but it was held that the
danger to the wife was niot sufficiently imminent; and further,
that the statute did not apply because the wife's consent to the
contemplated adultery prevented it from being a felony.
A long and almost uniform line of decisions has held that
the consent of the person injured does not prevent the in-
* Kingston v. Long, Bailey, Bills 6th Ed. 16; Colehan v. Cooke, Willis,
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jurious act from being a crime.2 The reason is two-fold: first,
because the state desires to punish the public disorder arising
from a crime irrespective of the private injury, or as has been
said by a learned author, "there are three parties here, one
being the state which does not allow the others to deal on a
basis of contract with the public peace ;''2 and secondly, in
case of the more serious crimes-the state desires to protect the
lives and health of its citizens.8 This is so even though the
offender commit the crime with no malice or anger.4 Further,
consent to an act for which relief is ordinarily given in a civil
action does not bar that relief, where the act complained of
involved a breach of the peace or an intention to do real hurt."
There are a number of crimes an element of which is the
lack of consent on the part of the one that the crime primarily
affects, such as rape and those crimes involving the hostile
taking of another's property, as larceny. As an element of
these crimes is a lack of consent, when the consent is given,
one element of the crime is absent and of a necessity the crime
does not exist. And even here where there is neither a breach
of the peace nor real injury but where there is a loss of chastity
not consented to, although the act was consented to,6 the state
negatives the consent.7
While some courts seem to have decided that the consent
of the injured party nullifies the criminality of an act, on
close examination the decisions will be found to only apparently
support such a proposition. Thus in one case the Court decides
that where two enter into an agreement to fight, there can be
no conviction for assault; not because consent nullifies the
crime, but because the defendant in that jurisdiction has been
guilty of an affray and not of an assault." The one case
which does allow the consent of the injured party to free the
defendant from culpability to the state confuses the questions
of malice and intent to injure and cannot be approved.9
If the suggestion of the Court in the principal case be law,
'Bishop on Crimes, Vol. i, Sec. 258 and cases cited.
'Cooley on Torts, 3rd Ed. i88.
"Reg. v. Coney, 8 Q. B. D. 534, Per Stephen, J.
'Com. v. Colberg, 11g Mass. 350.
'Adams v. Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531.
"Reg. v. Case, 4 Cox, C. C. 220.
'See article by J. H. Beale, Jr., in VIII Harv. L. Rev., 325.
' Champion v. State, 14 Ohio, 439.
'State v. Beck, x Hill (S. C.), 233.
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it is submitted that the right to kill to prevent a felony will be of
little use. The one interfering would always do so at his peril
since he has no means of knowing whether the felony is by
consent or not. And the defendant could not argue that the
commission of a felony that is being assented to creates the
same belief in his mind as though there were a real felony as
in State v. Yanz, 54 L. R. A. 78o, because the state justifies not
because of the slayer's state of mind, but because of its pro-
tection to the one against whom a felony is being directed. If,
as the case suggests, no felony is being committed, there is no
justification for the homicide.
UNLAWFUL ACTS AND PURPOSES iN BOYCOTTS.
In America, mercantile and labor monopolies appear gen-
eraly to be on the same footing and to be lawful, except only
as the means used or the purposes intended are unlawful." All
courts agree that there is a right in an individual to work or
not to work, to trade or refrain from trading, as he sees fit,
a contract relation always being absent. Some courts hold
this right absolute irrespective of the motive or injury,2 while
others hold it conditional upon the justification for the injury
to the correlative right in another.3 Then again, some courts
hold that what one may do as an individual he may do as one
of a combination,4 while others hold that this accumulated
power must be limited and justification must appear.5 Among
this latter class, there is a diversity of opinion as to what is
proper justification.
New York, New Jersey and Missouri are cited6 as upholding
the absolute right of mankind to act in the aggregate exactly
as in individual capacity. But when we consider the com-
'Crucial Issues in Labor Agitation, Prof. Smith, 2o Harv. L. R. 253,
345, 429.
'Hunt v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 583 (1854); Delta v. Winifree, 8o Tex.
400.
a Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871).
'Lindsay v. Federation, 96 Pac. (Mon.) 127 (igo8); National Pro-
tective Assn. v. Cummings, i7o N. Y. 315 (902).
'Plant v. Woods, 57 N. E. Iou, Mass. (i9oo); Arthur v. Oakes, 63
Fed. 3IO.
' Law as to Boycotts, Prof. Weyman, i5 Green Bag, 208; 17 Green
Bag, 21, 210.
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petition between the two unions in the New York case,7 and that
Curran v. Galin was not overruled, the decision of Parker, C.
J., is not necessarily against the general authority. A recent
case," in New Jersey, holding that "establishing pickets and
threatening economic harm by one who does not employ
labor (a labor union) for the purpose of unionizing a shop,
interferes with the free flow of labor and that the enticer is
not such a competitor in the market as to justify", places it
with the general authority. The dissenting opinion of Holmes,
J., in Plant v. WoodsO differs rather on the character of justifi-
cation than in regard to the general rule.
A boycott is generally held to be an unlawful conspiracy be-
cause the purpose is unlawful-as to unionize an open shop,'0
to bring one into a dispute to which he is not a party,1 ' to
induce the discharge of a workman because he does not belong
to the union,' 2 to secure to the union the right to decide finally
grievances, not common to all members, between employer
and employees, 13 or to compel an employer or trader to ac-
ceed to demands which he has a legal right to refuse. 14 Malic-
ious injury should always be unlawful. When the cause arises
in competition of trade 5 or labor 8 or the purpose is the
improvement of wages or the condition of labor, and such pur-
pose is not too remote, it is generally lawful, but, when freedom
of trade or labor or public policy are invaded, the courts are
more ready to hold it unlawful.'7
So, also, the boycott may be an unlawful conspiracy because
of the means used, such as the imposition of fines to compel
compliance of members,' establishing pickets to do or threaten
'National Protective Assn. v. Cummings, 37o N. Y. 315; Curran v.
Galen, 152 N. Y. 33.
'Jonas v. Glass Assn., 66 AtI. (N. J.) 953 (i9o7); Barr v. Essex
Trades, 53 N. J. Eq. 443 (i9o2).
'57 N. E. io0I; Veghelan v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92 (I896).
"0Barnes v. Berry, i56 Fed. 72 (i9O7); Shine v. Fox Bros., I59 Fed.
357.
" Pickett v. Walsh, 78 N. E. (Mass.) 753 (igo6).
"Berry v. Donovan, i88 Mass. 353 (1905).
'Reynolds v. Davis, 84 N. E. 427 (igo8).
'Barnes v. Union, 232 I11 425; 83 N. E. 94o (igo8).
1Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 23, Q. B. D. 598; Mc-
Cauley v. Tierney, i9 R. I. 255.
"Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 3io (1894).
"Trade and Labor Disputes, Prof. Lewis, 44 Amer., L. R. 465.
"Boutewell v. Marr, 71 Ver. i (i899).
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violence,19 interfering with the free flow of trade or labor by
annoying persuasion of pickets,20 by threats of economic harm
or by bribery or offers of economic advantage,21 by distributing
or posting circulars characterizing as "unfair," "legalized high-
waymen" and "scabs" and by requesting not to deal when the
circumstances are such as to make this a threat or a bribe.
22
Under the Sherman Anti-trust Act, any act which essentially
obstructs the free flow of commerce between the states or
restricts, in that regard, the liberty of a trader engaged in
business, is unlawful. 23  The coercive acts which the Court
enjoins may be without threats or commission of violence or
personal injury if the purpose is unlawful, as the threat of a
strike, unless they cease dealing as they lawfully may.24 So
also, where the purpose is unlawful (to unionize a shop) the
boycott is unlawful equally if accomplished by mere persua-
sion as by resort to acts of physical violence.25  Persuasion
or argument is lawful provided it is of such character as to
leave the person solicited to do as he pleases.28
To determine the character of the act, the strength, character,
and reputation for peaceful methods of the combination, the
sentiment of the community, or what a reasonable man might
expect upon refusal to act as requested, should be considered
by the Court to ascertain the free agreement. In the late case
in Montana,27 the acts appear to be held lawful because of the
peculiar interpretation of the surrounding facts. This case
goes to the extreme in favor of lawfulness of the acts and
purpose while Barnes v. Union28 marks the extreme in declar-
ing such a boycott unlawful.
2
"Brace Bros. v. Evans, 18 Pitts., L. J. 399 (1888); Erdinan v. Mit-
chell, 207 Pa. 79 (1893) ; Barnes v. Chicago Union, 232 IlL 425; Gold-
field v. Goldfield, 159 Fed. 5oo (igo8).
26 Vcgelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92; George Jonas v. Glass Assn.,
66 AtI. (N. J.) 953.
'Casey v. Cincinnati Union, 45 Fed. 135 (i891).
"Rocky Mountain Co. v. Montana Fed., 156 Fed. 809 (ixo7).
'Loewe v. Lawlor, 2o8 U. S. 275 (I9o8), Danbury Hatter's Case.
"Purvis v. Brotherhood, 214 Pa. 353 (1907).
' Barnes v. Union, 232 I1. 425.
'Goldfield v. Goldfield, 159 Fed. 5oo.
'Lindsay v. Federation, 96 Pac. 127.
' Barnes v. Union, 232 Il1 425.
"For discussion of the English Law see: Prof. Dicey's Article in
17 Har. L. R. 511; Prof. Lewis, 18 Har. L. R. 444, and 44 Amer. L. R.
465, and Prof. Smith, 2o Har. L. R. 253, 345, 429.
